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The Adaptive Dynamics Network at
IIASA fosters the development of
new mathematical and conceptual tech-
niques for understanding the evolution
of complex adaptive systems.
Focusing on these long-term im-
plications of adaptive processes in
systems of limited growth, the Adap-
tive Dynamics Network brings together
scientists and institutions from around
the world with IIASA acting as the
central node.
Scientific progress within the network
is reported in the IIASA Studies in
Adaptive Dynamics series.
THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS NETWORK
The pivotal role of evolutionary theory in life sciences derives from its capability
to provide causal explanations for phenomena that are highly improbable in the
physicochemical sense. Yet, until recently, many facts in biology could not be
accounted for in the light of evolution. Just as physicists for a long time ignored
the presence of chaos, these phenomena were basically not perceived by biologists.
Two examples illustrate this assertion. Although Darwin’s publication of “The Ori-
gin of Species” sparked off the whole evolutionary revolution, oddly enough, the
population genetic framework underlying the modern synthesis holds no clues to spe-
ciation events. A second illustration is the more recently appreciated issue of jump
increases in biological complexity that result from the aggregation of individuals into
mutualistic wholes.
These and many more problems possess a common source: the interactions of
individuals are bound to change the environments these individuals live in. By closing
the feedback loop in the evolutionary explanation, a new mathematical theory of the
evolution of complex adaptive systems arises. It is this general theoretical option
that lies at the core of the emerging field of adaptive dynamics. In consequence a
major promise of adaptive dynamics studies is to elucidate the long-term effects of the
interactions between ecological and evolutionary processes.
A commitment to interfacing the theory with empirical applications is necessary
both for validation and for management problems. For example, empirical evidence
indicates that to control pests and diseases or to achieve sustainable harvesting of
renewable resources evolutionary deliberation is already crucial on the time scale of
two decades.
The Adaptive Dynamics Network has as its primary objective the development of
mathematical tools for the analysis of adaptive systems inside and outside the biological
realm.
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Complex Adaptive Systems
and the Evolution of Reciprocation
Karl Sigmund
1 Introduction
Most of the major transitions in evolution consist in assembling units of some type
to form a new, hierarchically higher entity (Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1995).
As a rule, the reproductive potential is monopolised by a minority of the previous
units. This is most notably the case with multi-cellular organisms, where only
germ-line cells transmit the genome, or with colonies of eusocial animals having
large proportions of sterile workers. This channeling of reproductive opportunities
entails a close relatedness between elements of the higher order unit, and allows for
cooperation based on kin selection.
But in human societies, where cooperation is ubiquitous, there are remarkably
few individual inequalities in reproductive potential. A few potentates have managed
to obtain an almost unlimited control of their community and to sire several hundred
offspring, but these are exceptions which occured at a late, and probably transient,
stage of cultural evolution. Both in modern mass societies and in bands of hunter-
gatherers, social rules tend to level reproductive opportunities and to prevent the
establishment of a global controller. While a large part of the services and tasks
performed within households can be explained by kin selection, the bulk of human
cooperation is based, not on relatedness, but on reciprocation. Not genetic ties, but
economic exchanges explain the cohesion of human communities.
This implies that individuals collaborate only if it is to their own good. The
mathematical framework for studying the economics of interacting egoists is game
theory: more precisely, that branch of game theory which is, somewhat misleadingly,
called non-cooperative game theory (cf. Binmore, 1994). The term ‘non-cooperative’
means in this context that players cannot negotiate binding and enforceable agree-
ments. Such players can nevertheless achieve cooperation, not by the command of
a controller or by deference to the benefit of the group, but by following a myopic
set of rules evolved to optimise their selfish interests. The challenge lies in showing
how they do it in spite of the ever-present lure of defection.
Robert Trivers was the first to suggest reciprocation as a basis for mutual assis-
tance in animal behaviour (including human behaviour), and to discuss it in terms
of game theory. More precisely, he introduced the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to bring
the problem into focus (Trivers, 1971; see also May, 1987, and Boyd, 1988). This
approach was greatly expanded by Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton (1981),
who applied evolutionary game theory (see Maynard Smith, 1982) to populations of
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players engaged in many rounds of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game against
randomly chosen co-players. Already at this early stage, computer simulations were
essential to follow the complex nonlinear dynamics of the frequencies of strategies
submitted to natural selection (Axelrod, 1984).
A further decisive step was taken when Axelrod adapted the genetic algorithms of
John Holland (1975) to simulate the effects of evolutionary trial and error. This was
the first application of genetic algorithms to a genuine evolutionary problem (rather
than a technical optimization problem). It proved particularly successful because
the binary coding of strategies, usually a moot point with genetic algorithms, was
straightforward (Axelrod, 1987, see also Axelrod, 1997, and Epstein and Axtell,
1996).
This success led to many further investigations, including the effects of noise,
extending the memory, allowing for alternating moves, introducing more complex
state-based strategies, increasing the number of players, changing the payoff struc-
ture, restricting the interactions to neighbours only, addressing continuous versions
of the game etc. We present a short survey of this field, with pointers to the bio-
logical motivations behind these variants. The basic message is that details matter,
but that cooperation robustly emerges from a bottom-up approach based on recip-
rocation. We finally deal with indirect reciprocity, which is, according to Richard
Alexander (1987), the biological basis of human moral systems. In this setup, an
act of assistance may be returned, not to the donor, but to a third party. A model
based on the status of the players shows that cooperation can emerge even if any
two individuals never interact more than once.
This brief survey concentrates on papers dealing with pairwise interactions and
using evolutionary simulations. This is certainly not intended to deny the impor-
tance of other approaches to the evolution of cooperation (see Dugatkin et al, 1992).
2 Direct Reciprocation
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a two-player game where both players have the same
two strategies and the same payoffs. The two strategies are C (to cooperate) and
D (to defect). If both players use C, both get the reward R for mutual cooperation;
if both play D, both get the penalty P for mutual defection; a D player obtains
the temptation payoff T for unilaterally defecting against a co-player who plays C,
whereas the co-player receives the sucker’s payoff S for being exploited. One assumes
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. The first condition implies that D dominates
C, in the sense that it is better no matter what the other player chooses, and the
second condition entails that joint cooperation is better than sharing the payoffs
after a unilateral defection. Players have to chose D if they want to maximise their
payoff, and this yields the payoff P , which is less than the reward R for mutual
cooperation.
In the repeated PD game, players have to chose simultaneously, in every round,
whether to play C or D. There is a constant probability w for another round,
so that the average length of the game is random. The total payoff is given by
∑
Anwn, where An is the payoff in round n. The strategies for the repeated PD can
be arbitrarily complex, but in a biological context, it makes only sense to consider
– 3 –
strategies given by simple knee-jerk rules, like Tit For Tat (TFT, which plays C in
the first round and then simply repeats the co-players previous move). The first
lesson from Axelrod’s computer tournaments was that such simple rules, and in
particular TFT, more than hold their own against more sophisticated strategies
(based on stochastic optimisation, for instance).
Complex adaptive systems are used to simulate artificial societies of players
engaged in repeated PD games. In Axelrod (1987), strategies were considered which
played C or D depending on the outcome of the previous three rounds. They were
coded by binary strings of length 70. For every new generation, these strings were
submitted to point-mutation and recombination. The players then engaged in a
round-robin tournament, accumulating payoff points which translated into number
of offspring to form the next generation. An initial increase in defectors was often
followed by a re-emergence of cooperation.
Bendor et al (1991), Nowak and Sigmund (1992) and Kollock (1993) have con-
sidered the influence of noise, which is particularly disruptive in a society dominated
by TFT. When one allows only for reactive strategies given by different propensities
to play C, depending on the last move of the co-player, one finds that cooperation
emerges based on a tolerant rule called GTFT (Generous TFT), which retaliates
only with a certain probability after a D, but always cooperates after a C (up to
mistakes in implementation). This rule cannot spread in a society of defectors, how-
ever; it is necessary first that TFT invades and paves the way, like a pioneering
species in a plant community, for GTFT to take over (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992).
If one considers strategies which depend on the moves of both players in the
previous round, one finds a rich collection of far-from-equilibrium dynamics even
if only three or four strategies interact (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993a). Sufficiently
long mutation-selection chronicles usually lead to meta-stable cooperative regimes,
however, based (in case P + T < 2R) on Pavlov, a rule which cooperates if both
players used the same move in the previous round. Pavlov is a win-stay, lose-shift
rule: players repeat their previous move if it led to a high payoff (R or T ), and
try the other option if the payoff was low (S or P ). In a population of Pavlov
players, unilateral defections due to mistakes cause one round of mutual defection,
after which both players resume cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993b, Milinski,
1993). Pavlov exploits unconditional cooperators, preventing them from invading
and thus offering targets for exploiters. Again, cooperation can only emerge after
the invasion of stern retaliatory strategies like TFT, which then are superseded by
the error-proof Pavlov. TFT acts in this sense as a catalyser for cooperation.
It should be stressed that these simulations of artificial populations based on ex-
tended mutation-selection chronicles show a high degree of history-dependence and
often display punctuated equilibrium. This is particularly clear in Lindgren (1991),
where extensions of the memory were possible (caused by mutations reminiscent
of gene duplications which introduce strategies based not just the last round, but
on a larger window of the past). Usually such simulations led to the emergence of
cooperative strategies similar to Pavlov, or of variants defecting twice in a row, after
a mistake.
There exist very simple finite-state automata which cannot be described by rules
depending only on the outcome of a given number of previous rounds. An example is
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Contrite TFT (CTFT), a strategy that monitors the own standing and that of the co-
player. A player’s standing is good except after defecting against a player with good
standing. CTFT-players cooperate except if they are in good standing and their
co-player is in bad standing. In Boerlijst et al (1997) it is shown that such strategies
are good at invading populations of defectors and establishing a stable cooperative
regime. However, they are only immune against errors in implementation, whereas
Pavlov is also proof against errors in perception. Leimar (1997) has shown that
there exists a huge number of finite-state automata leading to limit-ESS (a version
of evolutionarily stable strategies). This implies a pronounced path-dependence of
evolutionary chronicles.
In the usual PD setup, both players are supposed to move at once. This is the
case, for instance, in predator-inspection games by sticklebacks or guppies, where the
fish take their mirror-image for a co-player (Milinski, 1987). In many situations of
mutual aid, however, players move alternatingly. This is the case, for instance, when
a well-fed vampire bat feeds a hungry conspecific (Wilkinson, 1984), or when a young
male baboon diverts the attention of the dominant male so that his pal can mount
an oestrous female (Packer, 1977). Simulations of the alternating PD (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1994, Frean, 1994, Hauert and Schuster, 1998) lead again to cooperation
based on error-proof strategies (not Pavlov, however, but Firm But Fair, a strategy
that defects only after an unwarranted defection by the co-player). Experiments by
Wedekind and Milinski (1997) support this distinction between strategies for the
simultaneous and the alternating PD.
If players do not interact at random, but only within a certain neighborhood
structure, cooperation becomes much more readily established, even for the one-shot
PD (see Nowak and May, 1992 and 1993, Sigmund, 1992, Huberman and Glance,
1993, Nowak et al, 1994a,b, Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994, Killingback and Doebeli,
1996, and for a general introduction to cellular automata in this context, Durrett and
Levin, 1994). Again, if players have the possibility of choice and refusal of partners,
cooperation becomes much easier to achieve (Stanley, Ashlock and Tesfatsion, 1994).
In both cases, aggregation of cooperators occurs through local rules. In contrast,
cooperation becomes much more unlikely if more than two players engage in the
interaction. For extensive simulations of this setup we refer to Hauert and Schuster
(1997).
It should be stressed that the PD is certainly not the only game modelling
aspects of cooperation. In particular, Sugden (1987) has stressed that the payoff rank
ordering T > R > S > P makes also sense in this context. In such an interaction a
player faced with a defector would nevertheless prefer to play C. This yields what
game theorists call the Chicken game and biologists Hawk-Dove. Repeated Chicken
need not lead to mutual cooperation based on reciprocity; it is more likely that an
asymmetry becomes effective and decides that one player will always play C and
the other D. This could shed some light on the intruder-inspections by female lions,
where one can often distinguish leaders and laggards (see Heinsohn and Packer,
1996).
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3 Indirect Reciprocation
In addition to reciprocation based on repeated interactions within a pair, there
exists another, indirect reciprocity, where the donor does not obtain a return from
the recipient, but from a third party. Donors provide help if the recipient has helped
others in the past. This works if the cost of an altruistic act is offset by a raised
‘score’, or status, which increases the chance to subsequently become the recipient
of an altruistic act. Cooperation is channelled towards the ‘valuable’ members of
the community. For Richard Alexander, ‘indirect reciprocity involves reputation
and status, and results in everyone in the group continually being assessed an re-
assessed’.
In Nowak and Sigmund (1998) this is modelled by a population of individuals
having the options of helping another or not. In each generation, a number of
potential donor-recipient pairs are chosen randomly: if the help is actually provided,
this implies a cost c to the donor, a benefit b to the recipient, and it increases the
donor’s score by one. The score of a player refusing to help is decreased by one.
Initially all scores are zero. We consider strategies given by integers k; a player with
such a strategy helps if and only if the score of the potential recipient is at least
k. We can follow the frequencies of the strategies from generation to generation,
allowing for occasional mutations.
A remarkably small number of interactions (for b = 10 and c = 1, an average
of two interactions per lifetime suffices, for instance) can lead to the emergence of
cooperative populations where most members use k = 0 or k = −1. If the simulation
is continued, strategies which are less discriminating spread: players with k = −3,
for instance, will rarely ever refuse to help, their score will therefore increase faster
than average, and hence they will in turn be helped more often. But if the frequency
of less discriminating players reaches a certain threshold, then defectors (players with
k = 3, for instance, who hardly ever provide help) can take over, with the result
that cooperation disappears in the population. Once this happens, the average
k-values will decrease again, leading eventually back to a cooperative regime of
players with maximal discrimination (i.e. k = 0). To summarize, random drift can
subvert populations of discriminate altruists by indiscriminate altruists; once their
frequency is large, defectors can invade; but as soon as the defectors have reduced
the proportion of indiscriminate altruists, the discriminate altruists can fight back
and eliminate the defectors. This leads again to a cooperative population which is
proof against defectors, but not against indiscriminate altruists, etc.
Such models show that indirect reciprocity based on image scoring works in
principle. It should be stressed that the chance of two players ever meeting again is
vanishingly small. All that needs to be known is the score of the co-player (see also
Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992). Even this image scoring need not be public knowledge.
One can modify the model to include, for every player, a private assessment of the
other group members. In particular, one can assume that an interaction between
two individuals is only observed by a small subset of the population. Only these
on-lookers will update their score of the donor. For larger groups, it becomes more
difficult to establish cooperation.
Models which are even more simplified help to explain analytically the cycling
behaviour, with its long bouts of cooperation interspersed by short periods of de-
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fection, which is reminiscent of the lack of stability near a critical state. Somewhat
surprisingly, cooperation is more robust if the society is challenged more frequently
by invasion attempts of defectors. One can compute the minimal amount of dis-
criminators, the minimal number of rounds per generation and the maximal size of
the society, for indirect reciprocity to work. This yields as necessary condition for
cooperation that the degree of acquaintanceship (the probability that a player knows
the score of the co-player) is larger than the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b. This result is
analogous to Hamilton’s rule which states that the degree of relatedness (the prob-
ability that an allele in the player’s genome is also present in the co-player) must
exceed c/b.
4 Discussion
The success in analysing the iterated PD should not hide the fact that variants
with more than 2 players lead only rarely to a cooperative outcome (see Hauert and
Schuster, 1997). Such N-person games have attracted much attention, for instance
as the Free Rider Problem or as the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). The
latter name suggests already, as a major application, the management of ecosystems.
More generally, how can individual restraint in the exploitation of a common
resource emerge and establish itself in the absence of a global controller? This
problem underlies the evolution of virulence, or the concept of the prudent predator.
In the human context, or more generally among individuals recognising each other,
the obvious solution – the punishment of selfish expoiters – leads to another dilemma.
To punish defectors is a costly, possibly dangerous activity, and it is tempting to
leave it to others. But this constitutes a second-order defection, which ought also to
be punished, etc. Several authors (Glance and Huberman, Boyd and Richerson 1988)
have adressed this problem. It seems plausible that the idea of indirect reciprocity
can be applied in this context.
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